Case Update

Tan Tiang Hin Jerry v Singapore Medical Council [2000] 2 SLR 274
Court of Appeal — Civil Appeal No 144 of 1999
LP Thean and Chao Hick Tin JJA and Tan Lee Meng J
19 January, 23 March 2000

Certiorari — Disciplinary proceedings — Jurisdiction of Complaints Committee of Singapore Medical Council in conducting inquiries into complaints — Whether inquiry went beyond scope of complaint — Whether time frame within which applicant was to be informed of further inquiry by Disciplinary Committee breached — Whether time frame for appointment of Disciplinary Committee breached — Whether decision to send matter for further inquiry before Disciplinary Committee unreasonable, irrational and disproportionate — Whether apparent bias or reasonable suspicion or apprehension of bias on part of Disciplinary Committee due to its composition

Engelin Teh SC, Thomas Sim and Juliana Lee (Engelin Teh & Partners) for the appellant.
Philip Fong, Chan Man Phing and Chua Sui Tong (Harry Elias Partnership) for the respondents.

The appellant, Dr Tan, an ophthalmologist in private practice, was involved through his shareholdings in a company called Specialist Eyecare Pte Ltd. This company owns an optical shop known as Specialist Eyecare Centre (‘the optical shop’), as well as an eye clinic known as Specialist Eyecare Clinic (‘the eye clinic’). On 26 January 1998, an article about the optical shop appeared in the Business Times. The article alluded to the fact that the optical shop had a licensed eye clinic under the same roof.

This article sparked off a complaint from Dr Cheong, the President of the Singapore Medical Association at the time, against Dr Tan. In his letter dated 8 April 1998 to the Singapore Medical Council (‘SMC’), Dr Cheong complained about Dr Tan’s shareholding interest in an optical shop and the possible conflict between Dr Tan’s role as a doctor and his financial interest in an optical shop.

The Complaints Committee of the SMC asked Dr Tan to respond to the complaint with a written explanation, which Dr Tan did on 20 May 1998, denying the allegations complained of by Dr Cheong. Some seven months later, Dr Tan was informed by the Complaints Committee that the matter would be placed before the Disciplinary Committee for further inquiry. Three months after this, SMC’s solicitors wrote to Dr Tan enclosing two charges which had been framed by the SMC, touching on Dr Tan’s professional conduct in relation to advertising the eye clinic through the Business Times article, as well as using the eye clinic to promote the optical shop.

Dr Tan applied to the High Court for a writ of certiorari and an order of prohibition on the basis that the Complaints Committee had acted outside the scope of its powers and against the rules of natural justice, but his application was dismissed (see [2000] 1 SLR 105).

Held, allowing the appeal:
The Complaints Committee had no power to inquire into matters beyond those raised in the complaint letter sent by Dr Cheong, which only concerned the potential conflict of interests between Dr Tan and his patients due to his financial involvement in the optical shop. The Complaints Committee was constrained by s 40(14) of the Medical Registration Act (Cap 174, 1998 Ed) (‘MRA’). As such, the SMC could not, on the basis of Dr Cheong’s complaint, proceed against Dr Tan in respect of charges of advertising and promotion before the Disciplinary Committee.

As Dr Tan was asked only to respond to the letter written by Dr Cheong, his main focus was on the allegation relating to the potential conflict between his role as a doctor and his financial interest in the optical shop. Dr Tan was thus taken by surprise and was not given a fair opportunity to be heard by the Complaints Committee on the charges of advertising and promotion.

The Complaints Committee and the SMC were not in breach of s 40(14) of the MRA as the inquiry was carried out within the time frame of three months from the date the complaint was laid before the Complaints Committee prescribed by this provision, even though Dr Tan was informed of the decision beyond this time limit. The SMC was, however, in breach of s 41(3) of the MRA which required them to appoint a Disciplinary Committee forthwith after the Complaints Committee had made an order for an formal inquiry to be held. The breach did not have the effect of nullifying the proceedings as Dr Tan had not suffered any substantial prejudice as a result thereof.

The Complaints Committee did not act in a way that no reasonable tribunal would have acted or which was irrational or disproportionate by deciding to send the matter before the Disciplinary Committee, and the composition of the Disciplinary Committee, which was to include at least two members of the SMC by virtue of s 40(4) of the MRA, did not mean that there would be apparent bias or a reasonable suspicion or apprehension of bias on the part of the Disciplinary Committee.

Arokiasamy Joseph v Singapore Airlines Staff Union [2000] 2 SLR 303
Court of Appeal — Civil Appeal No 132 of 1999
Yong Pung How CJ, LP Thean and Chao Hick Tin JJA
21 February, 22 March 2000

Natural justice — Decision not to refer matter to Industrial Arbitration Court — Whether union acted in breach of natural justice

See LABOUR LAW.

Arokiasamy Joseph v Singapore Airlines Staff Union [2000] 2 SLR 303
Court of Appeal — Civil Appeal No 132 of 1999
Yong Pung How CJ, LP Thean and Chao Hick Tin JJA
21 February, 22 March 2000

Trade union — Constitution of trade union — Contractual obligation — Whether constitution imposed obligation on union to represent members whenever requested Industrial Arbitration Court — Referral of alleged wrongful dismissal — Whether dispute over dismissal could be heard by Industrial Arbitration Court

Appellant in person.
Suresh Damodara and John Thomas (Colin Ng & Partners) for the respondents.

The appellant had been an employee of Singapore Airlines Ltd from 1973 until he was dismissed in March 1997. Between 1989 to 1995, he was seconded to the Singapore Airlines Staff Union (‘SIASU’) where he held various positions. In 1996, the appellant came under investigation by the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau and voluntarily resigned from his posts in the SIASU but retained his ordinary membership. In February 1997, the appellant was charged in the Subordinate Courts and as he was unable to raise bail, he was remanded in Queenstown Remand Prison until trial. While in remand, the appellant was dismissed from his employment by Singapore Airlines for being absent from work without proper authorisation. The appellant was subsequently acquitted in June 1997 and sought reinstatement. Negotiations for compensation in lieu of reinstatement failed and the appellant filed a writ against Singapore Airlines claiming damages for his alleged wrongful dismissal, but discontinued this action in May 1998.

Soon after this, the appellant wrote to the SIASU requesting it to file an application on his behalf to the Industrial Arbitration Court (‘the IAC’) under sections 35(1) and 82 of the Industrial Relations Act (Cap 136) (‘the IRA’) to adjudicate in the dispute between Singapore Airlines and himself. The SIASU decided not to do so and the appellant applied to the court for a declaration and an injunction to compel the SIASU to act pursuant to his request and refer the matter to the IAC. The appellant’s application failed at first instance (see [2000] 1 SLR 473) and he appealed, contending that the SIASU had acted both in breach of its contractual obligations to the appellant as a union member and against the rules of natural justice in deciding not to help him refer his case to the IAC.

Held, dismissing the appeal:

The SIASU was not required by virtue of art 3.2(iii) of its constitution to represent an employee in every case brought to their attention. A reasonable interpretation of the provision indicated that some discretion was built into the provision through the words ‘whenever necessary or desirable in their interest’. It was not a mandatory order. The fact that it was a practice or custom for the SIASU to do so in some situations was insufficient to establish the appellant’s contention that they were contractually obligated to represent him in this particular case. All that art 3.2(iii) required the SIASU to do was to consider the matter and assess if it was appropriate to intercede.

While the appellant’s case fell under the definition of a trade dispute as provided by section 31 of the IRA, the appellant was not able to make out a prima facie case that his case was one fit to be brought before the IAC as he was caught by the jurisdictional restrictions in sections 35 and 82 of the IRA. As the appellant was not dismissed for one of the reasons listed in section 82, there was no substantive basis on which the court could grant a declaration requiring the SIASU to apply to the Minister of Manpower on behalf of the appellant to refer the case to the IAC.

The minutes of the meeting showed that the executive council of the SIASU had sufficiently considered the matter, sought legal advice and concluded correctly that the appellant’s case did not fall within the purview of the IAC through the relevant provisions of the IRA. As such, the appellant’s contention that the executive council of the SIASU had not properly considered his request and had thus acted in breach of the rules of natural justice failed.