Case Update

Chaytor v Zaleha bte A Rahman [2001] 2 SLR 236

High Court - District Court Appeal No 710003 of 2000
Lai Siu Chiu J
7, 23 March 2001

Family Law - Maintenance - Muslim wife - Status of Muslim wife after pronouncement of talak - Whether considered married for purposes of maintenance - Jurisdiction over Muslim divorces - Whether civil courts should treat Muslim wife as still married until divorce confirmed by Syariah Court - Women's Charter (Cap 353, 1997 Ed) s 69(1)

Mirza Namazie (as counsel) with Chua Boon Beng and Alice Yeo (Tan Peng Chin & Partners) for the appellant.
Mary Edmonds (Chiang Wee & Partners) for the respondent.

Alan James Chaytor ('Chaytor') and Zaleha bte A Rahman ('Zaleha') were lawfully married at the Registry of Muslim Marriages Singapore, on 10 December 1995. Deanna, their daughter, was born on 5 December 1996. On 11 April 2000, Chaytor pronounced a single talak in the presence of two witnesses. On 24 May 2000, Chaytor filed Syariah Court Summons No 18599 of 2000 ('the Syariah Court Summons'). Prior to the pronouncement of the talak, Chaytor had been paying Zaleha a monthly sum as maintenance for her and Deanna. This stopped in May 2000. On 16 June 2000, Zaleha filed Maintenance Summons No 3175 of 2000 ('the Maintenance Summons') in the Family Court, for maintenance for herself and Deanna, pursuant to s 69(1) and (2) of the Women's Charter (Cap 353, 1997 Ed) ('the Charter'). The Maintenance Summons was heard on 24 August 2000. At the hearing, Chaytor objected to Zaleha's application for maintenance for herself, on the ground that they were divorced as from the date of the pronouncement of the talak, and that consequently, Zaleha was no longer eligible for maintenance under s 69(1) of the Charter since she was no longer a 'married woman' as required by the section. The district judge held that until the divorce was registered by the Syariah Court and a divorce certificate issued, the civil courts would still view the parties as married. As of the date of the hearing in the District Court, the Syariah Court had yet to adjudicate on the validity of the talak divorce. The judge therefore treated Zaleha as a 'married woman' for the purposes of s 69(1) of the Charter. Chaytor was ordered to pay Zaleha $1,500 per month as maintenance until the conclusion of the Syariah Court Summons.

Held, dismissing the appeal:
Section 69(1) of the Charter allows the civil courts to order payment of maintenance for a 'married woman'. For a Muslim woman, whether she is still a 'married woman' depends solely on Muslim law. Section 17A(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1999 Ed) and s 19(5) of the Subordinate Courts Act (Cap 321, 1999 Ed) state that jurisdiction over Muslim divorces lies solely in the Syariah Court. While the present case involves primarily the question of maintenance for a Muslim wife, it requires a preliminary assessment by the civil court as to whether she is still married under Muslim law. For this preliminary question, it is clear that the proper resolution lies not with the civil courts, but with the Syariah Court. Until the Syariah Court indicates that a divorce has been validly effected, the proper thing for the civil courts to do is to respect the fact that the marriage has been and still is registered, in the registry of Muslim marriages.

For the purposes of the Administration of Muslim Law Act (Cap 3, 1999 Ed), a married woman against whom a talak has been pronounced is still treated as a married woman, until its validity has been confirmed by the Syariah Court. That being the case, the civil courts should similarly treat a married woman against whom a talak has been pronounced in the same way for the purposes of s 69(1) of the Charter.

LEGAL PROFESSION

Wee Soon Kim Anthony v Law Society of Singapore [2001] 2 SLR 145

Court of Appeal - Civil Appeal No 60 of 2000
Yong Pung How CJ, LP Thean and Chao Hick Tin JJA
15 January, 13 February 2001

Legal Profession - Inquiry Committee - Complaint to Council of Law Society - Duty to refer to Inquiry Panel - Whether discretionary - Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 1997 Ed) s 85

Appellant in person.
Kenneth Tan Wee Kheng SC (Kenneth Tan Partnership) for the respondent.

The appellant lodged a complaint with the Law Society against two solicitors concerning their conduct in representing their clients in an action against the appellant. The Society replied to the appellant stating that his letter of complaint did not contain information of misconduct warranting a reference to an Inquiry Committee ('IC'). The appellant then applied to the High Court by way of originating summons for a declaration that the Society should have referred his complaint to the Chairman of the Inquiry Panel ('IP'), in order that the Chairman could constitute an Inquiry Committee to investigate the conduct of the solicitors complained against. The judge at first instance considered the merits of the complaints and directed that only one of a total of four complaints be referred to the Inquiry Panel. On appeal against the decision, the appellant contended that s 85(1) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 1997 Ed) should be read to mean that the Council of the Law Society had no discretion to reject his complaint on the basis of its merits, and that any complaint falling within the scope of the provision must in all events be referred to a duly constituted Inquiry Committee.

Held, allowing the appeal:
On a plain reading, s 85(1) provides that that a complaint, before the Council is required to refer to the IP Chairman, must relate to the conduct of an advocate and solicitor. Once that requirement is satisfied, the Council is obliged to refer it to the IP Chairman. It is not for the Council, at that stage, to go into the merits of the complaint. The function of the Council at that point is an extremely limited one. It is for the IC to inquire into the merits.

The Council had no discretion to reject a complaint on the basis that it was frivolous or vexatious, so long as, ex facie, it concerned the conduct of an advocate and solicitor. The scheme contemplated by the Act is that the IC is the first filter and the Council may not act as a filter prior to consideration by an IC. However, the IC is not bound to entertain a frivolous complaint and is free to reject such a complaint if that is its conclusion after investigation.