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An
analysis of Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (AP) [2001] UKHL 44This article will highlight the salient features of the almost 100-page long decision of the House of Lords on the question of when a bank is put on notice in surety transactions. The article also focuses on how the undue influence defence, typically raised in such surety transactions, may be avoided in the future.
The House of Lords in the landmark decision of Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (AP) [2001] UKHL 44 has provided guidance as to when a bank will be put on notice, that a surety's (usually the wife) relationship with a debtor (usually the husband) gives rise to a heightened risk of undue influence, and the steps to be taken in the future by the bank and solicitors in these circumstances.
The Etridge Decision
Eight appeals were heard together before the House of Lords. In seven of them,
the appellant was a wife who agreed to subject her property, usually her
interest in the matrimonial home, to a charge in favour of a bank in order to
provide security for payment of her husband's debts or the debts of a company in
which her husband carried on business. In each case, the bank commenced
proceedings for possession of the mortgaged property with a view to its sale and
the wife defended the claim by alleging that: (a) her agreement to grant the
charge was brought about by undue influence or misrepresentation, or both, on
the part of her husband; and (b) in the circumstances, the chargee bank ought
not to be allowed to enforce the charge against her. The question arose as to
whether the bank should be treated as having had notice of the impropriety or
alleged impropriety of the husband. The bank had some reason to believe that a
solicitor had acted for the wife in the transaction and thus the question also
arose as to the extent to which the solicitor's participation or believed
participation, had absolved the bank of the need to make any further inquiries
about the circumstances in which the wife was persuaded to agree to grant the
charge or to take further steps to satisfy itself that her consent to do so was
true and informed.
The eighth appeal was a case in which the wife was suing a solicitor for damages who advised her before she entered into a guarantee obligation in similar circumstances to the other appeals.
When is the Bank Put on Inquiry?
In Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge (No 2) [1998] 4 All ER 705, the
Court of Appeal held that it was necessary to prove in each case, before a bank
was put on inquiry, that the transaction was on its face not to the financial
advantage of the wife and that there was a substantial risk that, in procuring
the wife to act as surety, the husband had committed a legal or equitable wrong
that entitled the wife to set aside the transaction. The House of Lords in Etridge
stated that the Court of Appeal had erred and held instead that a bank is
simply put on inquiry whenever a wife offers to act as surety for her husband's
debts. The position is likewise if the husband acts as surety for his wife's
debts or in the case of unmarried couples - whether heterosexual or homosexual -
where the bank is aware of the relationship. The bank is also put on inquiry
where the wife acts as surety for the debts of a company whose shares are held
by her husband and her, even when the wife is a director or secretary of the
company.
In fact, the House of Lords went much further to lay down the principle, after a review of Barclays Bank plc v O'Brien [1993] 4 All ER 417 and Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch [1997] 1 All ER 144, that a bank will be put on inquiry in every case where the relationship between the surety and debtor is non-commercial. In its opinion, there could not be a rational cut-off point with certain types of relationships being susceptible to an increased risk of undue influence and others not. This principle, the House of Lords held, was simple, coherent and eminently desirable and did not go beyond the reasonable requirements of present times. It would prove a modest burden for banks and other lenders which is no more than what is reasonably to be expected of a creditor who is taking a guarantee from an individual. Banks and other creditors should, therefore, regulate their affairs in the future accordingly.
What Must the Bank Do Once it is Put on Inquiry?
The bank's responsibilities as previously set out in the seminal decision of Barclays
Bank v O'Brien [1997] 1 AC 180 have been significantly widened. The House of
Lords held that once a bank is put on inquiry, it has an obligation to take
reasonable steps to satisfy itself that the practical implications of the
proposed transaction have been brought home to the wife.
Whilst it is open to the banks to give advice to the wife directly, ordinarily, it would be reasonable for a bank to rely upon confirmation from a solicitor, acting for the wife, that he had advised the wife appropriately. However, the position is different if the bank knew that the solicitor had not advised the wife or if the bank knew facts from which it ought to have realised that the wife had not received the appropriate advice. In such situations, the bank would proceed at its own risk.
Most importantly, the House of Lords held that in future where the bank is put on inquiry and for its protection, the bank should take the following steps to ensure that the wife has been independently advised by a solicitor:
Some observations may be made at this point. The procedures previously adopted by the banks may not afford them adequate protection in the wake of Etridge. It is also simply not the solicitor's duty to obtain financial disclosure, the onus being on the bank to provide the wife's solicitor with the relevant financial information and to notify him of any suspicions that the wife might have been misled. It is, therefore, foreseeable that these areas will be contested in court if the bank gets this wrong. Under the circumstances, it is important for the bank to establish adequate measures and procedures to ensure that all the correct information is sent to the wife's solicitor and a record of what has been sent is maintained.
What Must a Solicitor, Who is Advising the Surety Wife, Do?
The House of Lords held that as a general proposition, the scope of a
solicitor's duties was dictated by the terms, whether express or implied, of his
retainer. As a first step, the solicitor will need to explain to the wife the
purpose for which he is involved. He should explain that, should it ever become
necessary, the bank will rely on his involvement to counter any suggestion that
the wife was overborne by her husband or that she did not properly understand
the implications of the transaction.
The solicitor will then need to obtain confirmation from the wife that she wishes for him to act for her in the matter and advise her on the legal and practical implications of the proposed transaction. The typical advice a solicitor will be expected to give should, as a core minimum, cover the following matters:
The solicitor's discussion with the wife should take place at a face-to-face meeting, in the absence of the husband, and should be couched in suitably non-technical language. The solicitor should obtain from the bank any information he needs. If the bank fails, for any reason, to provide information requested, the solicitor should decline to provide the confirmation sought by the banks.
Further observations on the obligation of solicitors may also be made. By implication, the 'core minimum' standards applicable to solicitors should also provide the standards to be observed by a bank that has decided to take on the role of advising the wife.
Evidently, the scope of a solicitor's duties in advising a wife in such transactions has also been dramatically reduced since the Court of Appeal decision in Etridge (supra). There the Court of Appeal held that solicitors had to satisfy the court that the husband had not brought undue influence to bear on the wife's decision. This itself involved investigations into issues such as the financial state of the business and the state of the marriage. With the House of Lords' decision in Etridge, the solicitor's role is reduced to ensuring that the wife understands the nature and effect of the transaction. Practically, this should provide a sigh of relief to solicitors, especially those specialising in conveyancing and mortgages who are unlikely experts in company finance or psychology. Had the House of Lords not overturned the decision of the Court of Appeal, many solicitors would have been weary of handling these commonplace transactions with their correspondingly onerous obligations.
Does the Wife's Solicitor Have to Act for Her Alone or May He Act for the
Husband or Bank as Well?
The House of Lords also dealt with this novel point and held that the solicitor
advising the wife does not need to act for the wife alone, provided he is
satisfied that that is in the wife's best interests and it will not give rise to
any conflicts of duty or interest. Further, when accepting instructions to
advise the wife, the solicitor assumes responsibilities directly to her, both at
law and professionally. These duties are owed to the wife alone and, in advising
the wife, the solicitor is acting for the wife alone. If at any stage the
solicitor becomes concerned that there is a real risk that other interests or
duties might inhibit his advice to the wife, he should cease acting for her.
The implications of Etridge will mean that in connection with these transactions, there need not be a host of solicitors each advising the bank, husband and wife. What is perhaps more important, is that both the solicitor (regardless of who he acts for) and bank work in tandem to ensure that not only are the wife's interests protected but that the bank may enforce its security without problems. This itself necessitates a proper understanding and application of the Etridge prescriptions to all relevant transactions.
Conclusion
Therefore, the challenge in such cases is for the law to strike a balance and
afford both parties to the transaction a measure of protection: wives need to be
protected against the risk of entering into transactions they do not understand
and banks need to be able to advance money in reasonable certainty that the
security obtained will be enforceable. In this sense, the detailed guidance
proffered by the House of Lords will have lasting practical implications for
banks and solicitors, who offer advice in these surety transactions, and all
those who seek to set aside secured transactions on the basis of undue
influence. If adopted, the guidelines will enable the bank to feel reasonably
secure that its loan will be enforceable and, in the alternative (albeit
unfortunately for solicitors), provide the bank with the means to shift its loss
in the unenforceable security to the solicitor in negligence if things go awry.
Clearly, in the event that the steps advocated by the House of Lords are
followed in the future, it will be difficult for a wife to maintain the defence
of undue influence because reasonable steps upon which the bank will be able to
rely on will have been shown, regardless of the strength of any claim of undue
influence.
Whilst the English decision in Etridge is not strictly binding on Singapore courts, it is important to remember that the House of Lord's decision will remain highly persuasive locally, especially since none of the local cases have provided any in-depth analysis into the obligations of banks and solicitors in these circumstances. Until our courts have had the opportunity to grapple with its minutiae, it will therefore be advisable and prudent for those involved in advising on these transactions to draw up their own internal guidelines as to how they should proceed, taking into account the clear prescriptions provided for in the House of Lords' judgment.
Nicholas Fernandez
Rajah & Tann