CIVIL PROCEDURE

Bayerische Landesbank Girozentrale v Dato Azlan bin Hashim [2002] 4 SLR 838
High Court — Suit No 1322 of 2001 (Registrar’s Appeal No 150 of 2002)
MPH Rubin J
3 July, 9 September 2002

Judgments and orders — Amendment — Judgment entered for sum greater than what was due — Jurisdiction of court to amend judgment — Whether jurisdiction existed — Rules of Court O 20 r 11 — Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1999 Ed) Sch 1 para 14

Fan Kin Ning (William Lai & Alan Wong) for the plaintiffs/appellants.
Alfred Tan (Alfred Tan & Co) for the defendant/respondent.

The plaintiff bankers applied for and obtained summary judgment against the defendant for a sum of US$416,049.11 and interest owing to them. It was later discovered that the defendants had remitted to the plaintiffs a sum of US$50,000 before the hearing for summary judgment, but due to an oversight on the part of the plaintiffs’ loan recovery department, this receipt was not communicated to the plaintiffs’ solicitors when he appeared in court to argue the summary judgment application. The defendant’s counsel, who was also present at the hearing, did not inform the court of the payment. The plaintiffs applied to amend the judgment, contending that the judgment was signed for a sum in excess of what was due or owing to them. The deputy registrar disallowed the plaintiff’s application on the basis that O 20 r 11 of the Rules of Court was inapplicable. The plaintiffs appealed.

Held, allowing the appeal:

The court is empowered under O 20 r 11 to amend a judgment entered, when it is established that the slip or omission was accidental and that such an amendment was not to the disadvantage of the other party. Here the amendment was not to the disadvantage of the defendant/respondent and he did not oppose the plaintiffs/appellants’ application.

Paragraph 14 to the Sch 1 to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1999 Ed) provides that the High Court shall have the ‘powers to grant all reliefs and remedies at law and in equity’. These additional powers conferred on the High Court are a useful adjunct which the court may draw upon as necessary where it is just or equitable to do so.

The plaintiffs/appellants’ explanation that the error was occasioned by an accidental lapse in communication, not at the time the claim was presented, but later when the application was in train, appeared to have considerable merit.

LEGAL PROFESSION

Re Lee Chu Ming Martin QC and another application [2002] 4 SLR 929
High Court — Originating Motion Nos 600028 and 600029 of 2002
Lee Seiu Kin JC
7 June 2002

Admission of Queen’s Counsel — Three-stage test for admission — Whether case of sufficient difficulty or complexity — Whether circumstances of case warranted court exercising discretion in favour of admission — Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2001 Ed) s 21

Dr Chee Soon Juan in person, on behalf of the applicants.
Jeffrey Chan and Leong Wing Tuck (State Counsel) for the Attorney General’s Chambers.
Yang Lih Shyng (Khattar Wong & Partners) for the Law Society.
Davinder Singh SC and Hri Kumar (Drew & Napier LLC) for the plaintiffs in the suits.

The applicants had applied under s 21 of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2001 Ed) for ad hoc admission to practise as advocates and solicitors in the High Court. They wished to represent Dr Chee Soon Juan (‘Dr Chee’) in two suits brought by Mr Lee Kuan Yew and Mr Goh Chok Tong respectively. The applications were dismissed by Tay Yong Kwang JC (‘Tay JC’) on two grounds. Firstly, the suits were not of sufficient difficulty and complexity to warrant admitting Queen’s Counsel. Secondly, there was nothing which merited the court’s exercising its discretion to admit the applicants.

The applicants did not appeal against Tay JC’s decision, but made fresh applications instead. In his affidavits in the present case, Dr Chee offered additional reasons to support his contention that the suits were sufficiently difficult and complex. He also claimed that he could not find local lawyers with the necessary experience and who would represent him for free.

Held, dismissing the applications:

As the applicants had not appealed against Tay JC’s decision, they were bound by his findings.

As the parties and issues were the same as in the earlier applications, the applicants were estopped from contending that the suits were sufficiently difficult and complex and that there was something which merited the court’s exercising its discretion to admit them.

The applicants should have filed an appeal against Tay JC’s decision, rather than have made fresh applications.