Cases

Courts and Jurisdiction

Attorney-General v Chee Soon Juan [2006] SGHC 54

High Court — Originating Summons No 285 of 2006

Lai Siu Chiu J

16, 17 and 31 March 2006

Courts and Jurisdiction — Contempt of court — Criminal contempt — Respondent reading out statement alleging court’s partiality and bias before assistant registrar in bankruptcy hearing and then circulating such statement to media — Whether respondent’s conduct amounting to contempt ‘in the face of the court’ by scandalising court in assistant registrar’s presence — Whether defences of fair comment or justification applicable to acts of contempt — Appropriate sentence for such contempt of court

Lee Seiu Kin, Teh Hwee Hwee and Dominic Zou (Attorney-General’s Chambers) for the applicant; M Ravi and Violet Netto (M Ravi & Co) for the respondent.

This was an application by the Attorney-General (‘the Applicant’) seeking an order of committal against Chee Soon Juan (‘the Respondent’) for contempt of court. Another court had on 16 February 2006 granted the Applicant leave under O 52 r 2(1) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2004 Rev Ed) (‘the Rules’) to apply for the order of committal.

The Applicant alleged that the Respondent was guilty of contempt on two counts: first, that he acted in contempt ‘in the face of the court’ at the hearing of the Bankruptcy Petition No 38 of 2006 against him before Assistant Registrar Low Siew Ling (‘AR Low’) on 10 February 2006 (‘the bankruptcy hearing’), and second, that he acted in contempt of the court by scandalising the Singapore judiciary through his statement entitled ‘Statement of Chee Soon Juan submitted to the High Court, Singapore at the Bankruptcy Petition hearing on 10 February 2006’ (‘the bankruptcy statement’).

After the bankruptcy hearing, the Respondent read and distributed the bankruptcy statement to media representatives outside the courtroom and purportedly copied the document to 59 persons and organisations in Singapore and elsewhere. In addition, a slightly amended version of the bankruptcy statement (‘the online version’) appeared on a website that was related to the Respondent. The website of the Singapore Democratic Party, of which the Respondent is the secretary-general, provided a hyperlink to the uniform resource locator (or ‘URL’) of the online version.

The bankruptcy statement, inter alia, alleged that the Singapore judiciary was biased and unfair, and that it acted at the instance of the Government or conspired with the Government in cases involving opposition politicians. The Respondent further alleged that he and other opposition politicians had suffered grave injustice because the Singapore judiciary was not independent and had compromised the law in order to gain favour with the Government. In addition, he insinuated that judges were controlled by the Government and were removed from the Bench if they were perceived to be lenient towards opposition politicians.

Held, sentencing the respondent to one day’s imprisonment and a fine of $6,000, with seven days’ imprisonment in default:

An AR hearing matters in chambers was treated as a ‘court’ to which the common law doctrine of ‘contempt in the face of the court’ applied. A judge in chambers and in open court had the same inherent powers, one of which was the power to punish acts of contempt committed before him. As an AR’s powers were derived from those of a High Court judge in chambers, his powers were indistinguishable.

Conduct that was insulting or disrespectful might amount to contempt ‘in the face of the court’ even though it fell short of being physically obstructive. In refusing to answer any questions posed by the AR at the bankruptcy hearing and then reading in court the bankruptcy statement that contained passages which scandalised the Judiciary, the respondent displayed a defiance that was aimed at interfering with the authority and proper functioning of the court, and at impairing the public’s respect and confidence in the Judiciary.

The preliminary objection raised by counsel for the respondent was misconceived. As the respondent’s contempt arose from his conduct during court proceedings (and continued outside the Supreme Court Building), these proceedings could justifiably be commenced by the applicant who is the Government’s legal officer.

There was no requirement in O 52 of the Rules of Court (Cap 332, R 5, 2004 Rev Ed) or at common law that a court, in whose face an act of contempt was committed, had to first warn the alleged contemnor that he would be cited for contempt if he did not cease his contemptuous behaviour. What was required was that a court summarily citing a person for contempt had to give him the right to reply to the charge, before finding him liable of the offence.

Case law from the Commonwealth and in particular recent jurisprudence from the UK had to be treated with considerable caution. Conditions unique to Singapore necessitated that the courts dealt more firmly with attacks on the integrity and impartiality of the Judiciary.

There was no right of absolute freedom of speech under art 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Rev Ed). The offence of scandalising the court fell within the category of exceptions from the right to free speech expressly stipulated under art 14(2)(a).

The respondent’s acts constituted an offence of scandalising the court as the allegations of bias mounted against the entire Judiciary in the bankruptcy statement were unequivocal and clearly attempted to impugn the integrity of the court. The respondent, by accusing the Judiciary of treating opposition politicians unfairly, had evidently imputed improper motives to all Singapore judges. By so doing, he had exceeded his right of fair criticism and entered the realm 
of contempt.

The offence of contempt was established when conduct tended to obstruct, prejudice or abuse the administration of justice either in relation to a particular case or generally. The fact remained that the statements made by the respondent, in impugning the entire Singapore judiciary, were calculated to prejudice the future administration of law throughout all Singapore courts.

The defamation defences of fair comment and justification did not apply to offences of scandalising the court. Allowing the defence of fair comment would expose the integrity of the courts to unwarranted attacks, as a belief published in good faith and not for an ulterior motive could amount to ‘fair comment’ even though the belief in question was not reasonable. Similarly, admitting the defence of justification would give malicious parties an added opportunity to subject the dignity of the courts to more bouts of attacks.

In deciding whether an act of contempt was serious enough to warrant imprisonment, two factors were determinative: first, the likely interference with the due administration of justice and, second, the culpability of the offender. A jail sentence was necessary under the circumstances so as to deter the respondent from repeating, and like-minded persons from committing, similar acts in future. Though offences which involved scandalising the Singapore courts have generally been punished by fines only, the present case could be distinguished from all previous cases. None of those cases involved situations where the contemptuous statements were actually read before the court. In addition, the respondent was not contrite nor did he make any attempt to withdraw his offending remarks.

The imposition of a jail sentence of one day on the respondent was to serve as a warning that henceforth, similar offenders could expect to be incarcerated and perhaps fined as well and, if the circumstances warranted it, sent to jail for longer periods too. Fines as the penalty for contempt of court of this nature would no longer be the norm.

As the respondent had been adjudicated a bankrupt, the fine imposed on him should not be a crippling sum which in default of payment would result in the respondent serving extra time in prison. Hence, the sum of $6,000 would 
be imposed.