Cases

Criminal Procedure

Goh Lee Yin v Public Prosecutor [2005] SGHC 226

High Court — Magistrate’s Appeal No 112 of 2005

Yong Pung How CJ

4 October; 15 November; 9 December 2005

Criminal Procedure and Sentencing — Sentencing — Mentally disordered offenders — Appellant pleading guilty to charges of theft in dwelling — Appellant suffering from kleptomania — Appellant appealing against two-and-a-half-month custodial sentence — Whether sentence manifestly excessive and should be varied to probation — Section 380 Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed), s 5(1) Probation of Offenders Act (Cap 252, 1985 Rev Ed)

Spencer Gwee (Spencer Gwee & Co) for the appellant

Hay Hung Chun (Deputy Public Prosecutor) for the respondent

This was an appeal against sentence. The appellant, a 25-year-old female, pleaded guilty to two charges of theft in dwelling under s 380 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed) and consented to have four other charges under the same section taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing. The appellant suffered from kleptomania, an impulse control disorder for which she required daily medication and regular treatment. The appellant, however, defaulted on her medication and treatment, which resulted in the commission of the shoplifting offences. The appellant was out on bail for her previous shoplifting offences when she committed the two other shoplifting offences.

Pursuant to the Prosecution’s application, the District Court ordered the appellant to be remanded for two weeks at the Institute of Mental Health for a psychiatric examination. A Registrar at the Department of Forensic Psychiatry diagnosed the appellant as suffering from kleptomania, an impulse control disorder. The Registrar also certified that the appellant was not of unsound mind at the time of the offences as she was aware of her actions and that they were wrong, and that she was fit to plead in a court of law.

The appellant was sentenced to two-and-a-half months’ imprisonment. The appellant appealed, arguing that the sentence was manifestly excessive and that she should have been granted probation. The appellant’s family and caregivers had instituted a 24-hour supervision plan to ensure that the appellant took her medication daily and remained constantly supervised.

Held, allowing the appeal and varying the sentence to 24 months’ probation:

The appellant was not ineligible for probation under s 5(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act (Cap 252, 1985 Rev Ed) (‘POA’). While the age of an offender was often indicative of the effectiveness of probation in bringing about rehabilitation, this did not lead to the inexorable conclusion that rehabilitation could never be the operative concern in the case of an offender above the age of 21 years, particularly if he or she demonstrated an extremely strong propensity for reform and/or there were exceptional circumstances warranting the grant of probation. The rehabilitation of the offender could also take precedence where other sentencing considerations such as deterrence were rendered less effective, as might be the case for an offender belabouring under a serious psychiatric condition or mental disorder at the time of the incident.

The court was impressed by the commitment and resolve of the appellant’s family and caregivers to look after her and ensure her adherence to the supervision plan. It was by virtue of the exceptional support and commitment on the part of the appellant’s family and caregivers to secure her recovery and rehabilitation that the essential conditions for the viability of her probation, namely daily medication, regular therapy and constant supervision, could be fulfilled. The appellant had also displayed tangible progress in her rehabilitation. As long as the appellant remained faithful in taking her daily dose of medication, her prognosis for complete recovery 
was positive.

Incarceration was no solution to the appellant’s problem; it would not serve to deter the appellant, whose offences were a manifestation of her mental affliction. It would instead exacerbate her condition and destroy the very last hope for her recovery.

[Observation: If the courts were to properly adjudicate on cases where the offender suffered from some medical condition, the courts had to be vested with the requisite sentencing discretion. Alternatively, it was to be greatly preferred if the Attorney-General’s Chambers would, after proper verification, refer mentally ill or otherwise deficient offenders to the appropriate Ministry or government agency where such cases might be more fittingly administered.]