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Thinking Out Loud |
Free Will, Mens Rea and Genes1
It is trite law that, with the
exception of strict liability criminal offences, to secure a conviction for a
criminal offence, it is necessary for the prosecution to prove the existence of
mens rea in the accused
when committing a crime. Mens rea
is about a state of mind, and intention and recklessness are the two states of
mind which constitute mens rea.
It goes to the issue of criminal responsibility. If an act, however
heinous, is not intended or reckless, the perpetrator could not be held
culpable for the act and its consequences. That is the law as we know it.
Whether an act is intentional or
reckless pre-supposes that free will exists. Hence a person is not criminally
responsible for an act when there is such mental disability that prevents him
from knowing either the nature and quality of the act
or whether the act was right or wrong. This doctrine encapsulated in the McNaghten Rules pre-supposes that the person labouring under such mental disability is incapable of acting
freely.
In fact, in the arena of law, free
will is a sine qua non. If, in fact, free will does not exist, then much
of our laws would be both meaningless and unenforceable. If an accused claims
that it was not out of his free will to intend an action or that it was not out
of his free will to be other than reckless, then it could be argued that he
should not be held responsible for that intention or recklessness.
The existence of free will is assumed
and never questioned, at least until recently. ‘Does freedom exist at all?’ is
a question asked by theologians, moralists and philosophers in the past. If
science is to be believed, this question may soon be answered in the negative. And
if it does not exist, then as the writer of the article ‘Free to Choose’1
puts it, ‘much of the glue that holds a free society (and even an unfree one) together’ may well fly out of the window.
Modern neuroscience now enables us to
watch the activity of the brain in real time – ‘watching the living human brain
in action in a way that begins to show in detail what happens while it is
happening’. It is said that ‘science will shrink the space in which free will
can operate by slowly exposing the mechanism of decision making’.
An example of this shrinking of space
concerns an accused who was convicted for collecting child pornography and
propositioning children. On the day he was due for sentencing, he had a brain
scan and it was discovered that he had a brain tumour.
The tumour was promptly removed, and to the amazement
of his observers, they found that his pedophilic tendencies vanished. Further, they
found that when the tumour started growing back, the
pedophilic tendencies quickly returned, and when the regrowth
was removed, they disappeared again. In such a situation, should he be held
criminally responsible for his pedophilic acts? Was he truly free to resist his
pedophilic tendencies?
Anger and violence are usually wrapped
up with crime, and scientists have invested resources in their study. They have found that anger and violence can
be both congenital and a pre- disposition in a person. They made these
conclusions from the discovery of concentrations of particular messenger
molecules in the brain. Again in light of such discoveries, should a congenital
or pre-dispositional violent person be held criminally responsible for his act? Was he
truly free?
Curious to know the thoughts of the
younger generation, I forwarded ‘Free to Choose’ to two young PhD candidates in
their respective fields for their response. The future geneticist has this to
say:
… the fact that we are starting
to understand the biological basis of behaviour is
not significant considering that there has never been - nor will there ever be -
any scientific basis for the belief in ‘free will’. No reasonable scientist
believes that it will be identified as a structure in the brain - or isolated
from tumors in the body, or from vapors in the air. Rather, I think that it
must transcend science - or not exist at all. The author seems to assume that
nothing can exist outside of science, and so free will cannot exist for the
author regardless of whether someone had a ‘pedophilic’ brain tumor in the 1990’s.
But the fact that some people might be pre-disposed to
criminal acts does raise some valid issues with regard to justice. In my
opinion, I think that morality should be based on social consequences rather
than individual motivations - and that the criminal justice system should exist
primarily to uphold social order, and not to punish ‘evil’ people.
The historian-to-be responds:
In history, free will is often referred to as ‘human
agency,’ and the question of the nature of human agency is a subject of
continuous debate. I think that people do have the ability to make choices, and
do make conscious decisions about their behaviour, but
only within certain constraints. These are, on one level, economic, political, and
moral constraints. There are also discursive constraints, which I believe
inhibit ‘free will’ – because we depend on discourse, or language, to construct
our self-consciousness as the basis of ‘free
will’; because discourse pre-exists the individual; and because discourse
is limiting and always already imbued with very specific meanings.
Humans are always also constrained by physiological and environmental
structures, which are in the realm of science, but one that philosophers, historians,
and other scholars of the humanities have traditionally neglected. The article
you sent is an example of a broader effort to integrate the two fields, which
are actually, I think, inherently related.
However, despite all of these constraints –
poverty, gender, race, discourse, the workings of the body and the brain, and
the physical environments in which we live – humans always have some choice, and
have always, historically, exercised that choice. Even apathy is a choice. So, although
it may be a fact that a brain tumor has an effect on this individual’s behaviour, the way in which this individual reacts to this
particular physiological constraint has to do with both external forces – those
political, economic, and social/moral factors – as well as that individual’s
choice and free will, in how he or she responds to these multiple constraints.
While the idea that the criminal justice system
should uphold social order rather than punish ‘evil’ is a good and noble one, the
idea of social order must inevitably be premised on some conception of good and
evil. In order for the concept of morality to exist, there must be some
judgment made at some level about what is good for society and what is not, what
constitutes order and chaos, what is acceptable behaviour,
etc.
There you have it: two young people
from non-legal backgrounds, one in science and the other humanity, but both
agreeing that free will does exist, and we are responsible for what we choose, how
we respond and the social consequences that follow. That being the case, mens rea will continue to
be relevant for determining criminal responsibility (strict liability criminal
offences excepted) unless someday, in the distant future, on the balance of
probability, our society may collectively decide that free will does not in
fact exist at all. But that decision itself is premised on the existence of
free will and it will be a case of exercising our free will to do away with
free will!
William Wan
Kelvin Chia
Partnership
E-mail: william.wan@kcpartnership.com
Notes
1 This reflection is provoked by an article ‘Free
to Choose’ in the Economist (Dec 23 2006).