‘Letter of Wishes’ and Consent in the Muslim Estate

FEATURE

'Letter of Wishes’ and Consent in the Muslim Estate – The Validation Process

The deployment of the ‘Letter of Wishes’ and of the legal beneficiaries’ consent in the planning of a Muslim estate in Singapore are looked on as permissible options to modulate in a limited way, the application of the inheritance rules under Hukum Faraid. These practices are examined in the context of some prevailing controversies and also of issues raised in the case of Husain Safdar Abidally v Shiraz Safdar Abidally & Another.Today, many financial and estate planners are only too ready to advise that a Muslim bound to observe Faraid¹ may obtain the consent of the Faraid beneficiaries to provide for distribution according to the wishes of the testator – of course with the concurrence of all the Faraid beneficiaries, if there is to be a deviation from or alteration of the distribution ruling under Faraid. This arrangement or circumvention would appear to be validated under Muslim law. Distribution according to Faraid may be ‘rearranged’ so long as the legal beneficiaries consent to the arrangement. The rule of unequal distribution among the legal beneficiaries in a Muslim family may as a general rule, by consent and agreement, be modulated to an equal distribution or other agreeable distribution ratio. It is said that such consent of the legal or Faraid beneficiaries may be made before or after the execution of the will, depending on the sect to which the testator belongs.² The application of this arrangement raises some pertinent questions.

The Basis of Faraid
Faraid is based on the provisions given in the Quran. The Syariah Court website³ quotes as follows:

Allah enjoins you concerning your children: the male shall have the equal of the portion of two females; if there are more than two females, they shall have thirds of what he has left, and if there is one, she shall have the half; and as for his parents each of them shall have the sixth of what he has left if he has a child; but if he has no child and only his two parents inherit from him, then his mother shall have the third; but if he has brothers, his mother shall have the sixth after the payment of any bequest he may have bequeathed or a debt. You know not whether your parents or your children are nearest to you in benefit. These are settled portions ordained by Allah and Allah is All-Knowing, All-Wise. (4:1)

The procurement of the legal beneficiaries’ consent to rearrange or provide an alternative distribution of a Muslim estate among the legal beneficiaries is subject to restrictions. Indian authorities on this subject clarify the beneficiaries’ right to do so in these words:

One of the most important limitations to the testamentary capacity of a Muslim is the maxim: No bequest to an heir. This is based upon a sentence in the Prophet’s Last Sermon on the day of the Farewell Pilgrimage. He is reported to have said that God had given to every one his due, therefore there shall be no bequest to one who is entitled to inherit. Thus, we have the rule applicable to all the Sunnite schools and the Fatimid school, that a bequest to an heir is not valid unless the heirs consent to it. Such consent, as we have seen above, must in Hanafi law be obtained after the testator’s death; but in Ithna ‘Ashari and the Fatamid law, the time when the consent is obtained is immaterial; it may be obtained either before or after the death of the testator.⁴

Alternative Distribution by Consent
The consent of the legal beneficiaries serves to modulate the application of the distribution of estate under Faraid. The result is not unlike the practice where a beneficiary under a secular will renounces in whole or in part his entitlement to the remaining beneficiaries.⁵ The beneficiary in question signs a Renunciation. However, this analogy ends here, as there are restrictions within Faraid to ensure that disposable assets under a Muslim will must be limited to one-thirdof the estate. The effect of the intervention or introduction of the consent together with the adoption of the Letter of Wishes of a testator has been the subject of a recent court decision.⁶

In a Muslim estate in Singapore, the consent to be obtained from a Faraid beneficiary or beneficiaries will typically allow the legal beneficiary’s share entitlements to be distributed according to the wishes of the consenting beneficiaries. This may typically again refer to the whole estate or to two- thirds of the estate, in the latter event, where the disposable third of the estate devolves under the will.

Issues Surrounding the Combined Use of the Letter of Wishes and the ConsentThe current issues surrounding the adoption and use of the Letter of Wishes and the procurement of the consent are reiterated below:

1    At what point in time should the consent be obtained – before or after the death of the testate/intestate? Or at both times?
2    Is the consent retractable?
3    Can the Letter of Wishes and a retracted consent form the basis of a valid agreement under Muslim law?
4    Is a de facto consent crucial to modulating the Faraid distribution rules or would consent by implication or evidentiary deduction suffice? This article will attempt to examine the said issues.

Consent and Burden of ProofIn the early High Court case of Re Estate of Siti bte Naydeen⁷ FA Chua J on evidence, found that there was no consent proven to have been obtained from the male heir under the deceased’s estate. In that case, the defendant had alleged that Mansor, the deceased father of the plaintiff, had consented to the distribution of the estate of Siti bte Naydeen wholly to the defendant’s mother, in accordance with the will. On the issue if the consent had in fact been given by Mansor to the distribution in accordance with the testator’s wishes, the judge made the following observations:

I have to weigh this evidence of Abdullah with great care. It would appear that at the discussion in 1965, Mansor did not specifically give his consent, he merely ‘did not object to the wishes of the testatrix’.

FA Chua J further reasoned:

If at all Mansor did consent and was happy about it, surely the defendant would have got the written consent of Mansor. It can be deduced here that if a consent had been truly made in the circumstances of the case of Re Estate of Siti bte Naydeen, it was one which must be specifically made and not gathered by implication of Mansor’s non-objection to the wishes of the testatrix. The judge also went further to comment that a written consent could also have been obtained by the defendant.

The issue over the consent of a legal beneficiary in a Muslim was again raised in the case of Husain Safdar Abidally v Shiraz Safdar Abidally & Another⁸ where such a consent was concluded from the conduct of the party giving the consent.

Husain Safdar Ahidally v Shiraz Safdar Abidally & Another – Issues at the Trial
The brief facts of this case are that Abidally, a Muslim man, executed his will dated 13 January 1992, under which he bequeathed one-third of his property to his grandchildren and other persons. By a Letter of Wishes dated 5November 2000, the deceased stated that all the cash balance in his three joint accounts were to be distributed equally among his two sons and four daughters – ‘not according to Muslim law’. On 18 May 2003, two days after the death of the deceased, all the children decided to comply with the Letter of Wishes. On 19 May 2003, the will was discovered and its contents made known to all the children. On the same day, the money which was in the joint names of the defendant and the deceased, was distributed by the second defendant, on terms set out in an Indemnity initiated by the plaintiff. On 7 August 2003, the plaintiff objected to the equal distribution, choosing to assert his right to his entitlement under  Muslim law.

In this case, some relevant aspects of Muslim law were not in dispute and contending parties proceeded on these common grounds:

1    the deceased could not dispose of more than one-third of his estate by his will;
2    a letter of wishes was not binding on the beneficiaries, but they could agree to comply with it;
3    the beneficiaries to an estate under Muslim law could agree to vary the apportionment of their shares that were prescribed by Muslim law;
4    the deceased’s children could agree to vary their shares to two-thirds of the money in the joint accounts, but they could not agree to vary the distribution of all the money in the joint accounts; and
5    in the absence of any agreement, each of the deceased’s sons would receive twice the share of each of the deceased’s daughters in two-thirds of the money in the joint accounts.⁹

The ‘Informed’ Consent
Should there have been an examination in Husain Safdar if the consent had indeed been truly given? It could be argued that the retraction of the consent per se renders it to be effectively a non-bona fide consent; as such a consent must necessarily be a decision over which the beneficiary in question must sincerely (ikhlas) wish to make. The argument of the plaintiff in the case of Husain Safdar was based on the submission that the consent given by him to the equal distribution of the estate was not an ‘informed consent’. At the time the consent was given, he was not aware of the existence of the will although he knew that under Muslim law, the male heirs are entitled to twice the shares of the female beneficiary when consent to the equal distribution of the estate was given.

Letter of Wishes – A Directive
In Husain Safdar, would the beneficiaries’ consent have the effect of validating the testator’s direction under the Letter of Wishes? The defendant’s argument before the trial judge was that the plaintiff was ‘bound by that consent under the applicable Muslim law.’¹⁰ That consent as maintained by the plaintiff was referable to, and premised on the directive made under the unenforceable Letter of Wishes and not to any agreement.

The plaintiff’s submission did not take up the point that the plaintiff thought that the letter of wishes was binding on him. The closest that it came to was that he [the plaintiff] took the equal share because he took the Letter of Wishes as the deceased’s directive, not because of any agreement ... but nothing turned on that in the end.

The plaintiff maintained that he had not given his informed consent to the distribution even though he conceded that he knew at that time that the distribution was not in accordance to Muslim law under which a man would receive twice as much as a female child. He also alleged that he thought the letter of wishes was binding on him although this was not stated in his affidavit or opening statement.¹¹

The High Court, however, went on to question: ‘Is the agreement sufficient?’¹² This would be both a question of fact and law. Under the applicable Muslim law, the legal beneficiaries may by consent, opt for equal distribution should they chose to observe the direction under the Letter of Wishes. Yet, this right to consent operates independently of the Letter of Wishes. However, in Husain Safdar the consent as argued by the plaintiff was directed to the whole estate envisaged in the context of the Letter of Wishes and not the distributable two-third of the estate under the will. It was the contention of the plaintiff that the consent and therefore agreement, should relate to the fact situation of the Letter of Wishes and not to that under the will.

Decision at the Trial
The decision of the High Court in Husain Safdar turns on the findings that the agreement among the beneficiaries of the estate based on the Letter of Wishes could not be relied upon as that very Letter of Wishes was not binding under the distribution laws applicable to the testator. The intervention of the beneficiaries’ consent and agreement could and did change that position somewhat but the sufficiency (and validity perhaps) of that agreement was questioned. The testator’s will provided for one-third of his estate to be given to his grandchildren and other persons – thus reducing the distributable estate to two-thirds in size. The consent and agreement was de facto given in the context of the Letter of Wishes and not in the context of the will which referred to the reduced (two-thirds) of the money in the joint accounts. The evidence on the subsequent acceptance by conduct of the beneficiaries of the equal distribution after the discovery of the will, although submitted by the defendants at the trial, did not bear on the decision of the High Court.

The Court of Appeal’s Decision
In February 2007 an appeal by the defendant was allowed by the Court of Appeal. It observed that the agreement to divide the estate equally based on two-thirds of the estate under the will (representing the Faraid beneficiaries’ entitlement) was not inconsistent with Muslim law. The Court of Appeal in Shiraz Abidally and Another v Husain Safdar¹³ considered the respondent’s intention and relied on the evidence that ‘the respondent was agreeable to and was satisfied with the equal distribution, with full knowledge of his entitlement under Muslim Law’.¹⁴ This conclusion was said to have been buttressed by the fact that the respondent had on his own initiative drafted the Deed of Indemnity on terms which clearly showed his understanding of the situation. Further, the respondent was said to have been motivated to accept the equal distribution for the cash settlement over his entitlement under the will. Distribution of this entitlement would otherwise be postponed to a date five years later.Understandably, the logical approach taken at the High Court required it to look at the legality of the Letter of Wishes in the context of the disposable one-third of the estate under the will and on that premise, to determine the sufficiency of the consent and agreement of the beneficiaries for equal distribution of all the money in the joint accounts. However, the Court of Appeal seemed to surmise that logic alone did not quite make the law. In Muslim law, there was no impediment to the respondent consenting to an equal distribution independently of the Letter of Wishes and hence, to two-thirds of the money in the joint account. Based on the compelling evidence of the conduct of the respondent after the discovery of the will, the Court of Appeal therefore took the position it did. The Court of Appeal stated:¹⁵

The trial judge applied the very logical approach that the respondent had only agreed to an equal distribution of all the moneys in the bank accounts, and not to two-thirds of such moneys. Obviously, as statements of fact, one is not the same as the other. However, as statements of intention, the larger can apply to the smaller. Admittedly, this conclusion in itself might be open to objection on the ground that the trial judge’s conclusion is logically just as valid. Nonetheless, the events following the discovery of the will on the next day, 19 May 2003, unequivocally support our conclusion over that of the trial judge.

Basis for the Consent
In the search for the basis of the beneficiaries’ consent to provide an alternative distribution to the testator’s stated direction under a will, the writer found the following excerpts¹⁶ from a translation of the Quran:

2.180
It is prescribed, when death approaches any of you, if he leave any goods that he make a bequest to parents and next of kin, according to reasonable usage; this is due from the Allah-fearing.

002.181
If anyone changes the bequest after hearing it, the guilt shall be on those who make the change. For Allah hears and knows all things.  

002.182
But if anyone fears partiality or wrong-doing on the part of the testator, and makes peace between (The parties concerned), there is no wrong in him: For Allah is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful.

 Is Estate Planning Inherently Inconsistent with the Spirit of the Faraid Distribution?From the above excerpts, it is seen that the Quran has specifically provided for the intervention of the consent to enable limited alteration to the Faraid distribution laws: The legal beneficiaries are entitled in the ratio of two shares to the male beneficiary as against one share of the female beneficiary subject to claims, if any, under the will (wasiyahh) to the disposable one-third portion of the estate.¹⁷ In this regard, it might be meaningful to reflect on the thoughts of Abdul Aziz Hassan who wrote:

As God-fearing Muslims we are duty-bound to recognize the Faraid laws. At the same time the Faraid is not cast in stone and may be waived if all heirs (assuming all are above the age of maturity) consent to it. What is important is for all heirs to understand the ratio of entitlement, the value of that ratio of entitlement and thereafter come to some agreement/arrangement to distribute the estate.

The understanding of Muslims pertaining to Faraid sometimes goes deeper. Some Muslims actually think that by making a wasiyyah, the Faraid does not apply. What they do not understand is that the wasiyyah is not a form of distribution, but merely a claim against the estate, after which the balance will be distributed according to Faraid. However, the heirs, if all are above the age, may agree to an alternative form of distribution.

The said writer went on to make this cryptic observation which points to some anticipation of estate planning making possible inroads into Faraid:

It is said that the knowledge of Faraid will be one of the first to disappear (taken away) from the ummah of the Prophet Mohammad before the end of time. Let us all reflect on this and resolve to understand and apply it to our estate planning needs, so that we can really appreciate the completeness (syumul) of Islam as a complete way of life.

What Then are the Options Open to the Muslim Community in Singapore?

Some case law decisions have been made on the interpretation of Islamic concepts within the technical grid of the legislative regime – some of those have given rise to parallel stands taken by the secular Court, the Syariah Court and MUIS.¹⁸

Some of the issues which have been raised by the Muslim community in Singapore are highlighted below. The common concerns notwithstanding, they point to the de-facto polarisation of the positions taken by the relevant law keepers:

1    Rearrangement of Faraid distribution under a will or Letter of Wishes. (Siti’s case. Husain Safdar)¹⁹
2    Nurziah established over assets passing on death.
3    Early distribution of assets subject to a trust for pre-AMLA²⁰ estates.
4    The Haji Yusof story.²¹
5    Trusts creation after AMLA.
6    Haji Yusoff case. Issues in this case relate to the creation of a trust under a pre-AMLA will.
7    Husain Safdar’s will makes reference to the creation of a trust over the income of the estate for a period of five years. This was not raised as an issue under the court proceedings but this trust did appear to have influenced the decision taken by the plaintiff to consent to the equal distribution of the testator’s estate.
8    Right of survivorship under a joint tenancy? MUIS Fatwah on the issue of joint tenancies of real estate has brought uncertainties to practices for estate planning.
9    What of the CPF Nomination? MUIS’s fatwah decrees that CPF monies forms part of the estate of the deceased, not withstanding any prior nomination.

It is not the intention nor is it within the scope of this work to examine the issues raised above. The layperson will need some signposts as to how to deal with these contingencies. The establishment of the parallel regime of secular laws introduced under AMLA and religious laws must be met with some workable equations. Meanwhile there are some areas of agreement over the legal options available to the Muslim community and which may be considered and deployed in their estate planning. These are merely mentioned below.

Legal Options
The list below provides a sampling of other legal strategies which may be considered when estate planning is undertaken. Needless to say, care and attention must be directed to the minutiae of legal processes and compliance requirements of planning as well as documentation to ensure the effectiveness of the arrangements adopted.

1    Gift inter vivos (Hibah).
2    The Nazar.
3    A valid Nurziah.
4    Some types of insurance.
5    Bona fide consent (amounting to a Renunciation or a voluntary redistribution of a deceased’s assets).
6    Disposition of one-third of estate to non-Faraid beneficiaries.
7    One-third of assets as donatio mortis causa.
8    Fractional ownership of real estate under a tenancy in common.
9    Creation of a joint tenancy (a controversial subject in the context of the MUIS Fatwah).
10 Creation of life Interests under a will.

Controversies
Admittedly, the deployment of the above legal options as part of the estate planning strategies are not without problems. Some controversial issues involving the application of the provisions of AMLA and other applicable legislation over inheritance, alongside Faraid have presented uncertainties in the interpretation and application of the laws.

The current fatwah over the issue of the right of survivorship (joint tenancy) in particular, issued by MUIS over the entitlement of the survivor of property held as joint tenants have rendered estate planning for Muslims uncertain and confusing.²² There is a need for MUIS to clarify its stand on joint tenancy in real estate and the right of survivorship among Muslims in Singapore and perhaps to review the current position it has taken on this issue. In a case in India, ‘the High Court has laid down that there is nothing in Mohameddan law against the creation of a joint tenancy with benefit of survivorship.’²³ (Emphasis added)

Further, the circumstances under which a valid Nurziah could be created, was examined in the case of Mohamad Ismail,²⁴ with the Court of Appeal taking the position that this practice must operate as and comply with the requirements of a gift inter vivos if it is to be considered property not passing to the estate of the testator. The position taken by MUIS that the Nurziah, has special qualities capable of operating on death or after death to confer entitlements to the named beneficiary was rejected by the court. ²⁵

As for the Letter of Wishes,²⁶ this instrumentation has been understood as not binding for Muslims in Singapore under Shafie practices. Its effectiveness, at best, lies in its persuasive influence on the minds and conscience of the legal beneficiaries. Its adoption may complicate the interpretation of wills generally and of the management of the estate. Obstacles also lie in the probability that the intention and motivation of the testator may not be acceptable to the legal beneficiaries from whom the consent must be sought. Furthermore, any expression of any obtuse deviations from the distribution rules under Faraid by the instrumentality of the Letter of Wishes will erode the true understanding of the rules decreed under Faraid. This will surely come to pass should the community become pre-occupied with the rearrangement of the Faraid distribution. Would it be in the spirit of Faraid to allow precision planning to over-reach the true intent of the distribution rules? These are questions which our law-keepers must deal with. Meanwhile, having regard to the matters discussed above, we may need to use some discretion or even navigate from such instruments as the Letter of Wishes. On its own, it legally promises only wishes, no more, no less.

Summary
Findings of the High Court decision in Husain Safdar

1 The Letter of Wishes deployed in Husain Safdar is not binding but may be complied with if there is consent of the legal beneficiaries and the distribution rules under Faraid on the disposable one-third portion are observed.
2 There can be no consent or agreement made by the legal beneficiaries to the equal distribution of the deceased’s estate premised on two-thirds of the joint accounts mentioned under the testator’s will when the consent was actually given in the context of and according to the direction stated under the Letter of Wishes which made reference to all the money in the joint account.

Conclusions of the Court of Appeal
The conduct of the legal beneficiaries subsequent to the discovery of the will, bear heavily on the interpretation to be given to the intentions of the legal beneficiaries as to convince the Court of Appeal to conclude that there was indeed agreement to the equal distribution of the deceased’s estate as permissible under Muslim law.

Query
These questions are reiterated: Is the consent to be given by the legal beneficiaries to provide an alternative distribution among themselves retractable? Before distribution? After distribution? In the spirit of Faraid, will consent not be required to be willingly and therefore truly given and its bona fide unquestionable? No doubt, there are legal and practical issues to be overcome when assets have been distributed. It would seem that the answers will have to be found within Faraid, not the English Common Law.

Dr Abid Hussain in his article, The Islamic Wills²⁷ said:

acceptance or rejection of a bequest by the legatee is only relevant after the death of the testator and not before. generally speaking once a legatee has accepted or rejected a bequest he cannot change his mind subsequently.

That said, the bare statement made above cannot in the mean time per se, provide a conclusive answer. Exceptions or mitigating circumstances are not raised or discussed – such as when the acceptance or rejection has been made out of context, under a mistake of fact or if there are other justifiable or valid reasons for an acceptance or rejection to justify a retraction.

RamificationsIt is submitted that the process of validation is crucial in the application of Muslim law in Singapore. Some guidance on this process points to the necessary references to acceptable authorities and practices.²⁸ Technical approaches and legal deductions are a part of that validation process but may not fully support or justify the interpretation and conceptual application or non-application of Muslim law to current issues prevalent in Singapore. The flexibility allowed under Muslim law in the intervention of the legal beneficiaries’ consent to modulate the effects of or to provide alternatives to the application of the Faraid rules on distribution does reflect the recognition of the exercise and interplay of personal and collective free will accorded under Muslim law.

Would this spirit inherent in Muslim law in the acceptability of the consent as a way to introduce an alternative distribution to a testator’s estate similarly support the motivations behind estate planning? As seen in the Court of Appeal conclusions in Shiraz Safdar, rules of interpretation and social justice are relevant in facilitating and aligning these religious concepts to today’s realities.²⁹ However, given the fact situation established in Husain Safdar, should the Court of Appeal have pursued the issues based on the preference for the spirit and validity or invalidity of the consent under Faraid rather than on contract principles? The technical or evidentiary route adopted by the Court of Appeal in Shiraz Safdar in ascertaining consent or agreement of the legal beneficiaries outside the context and spirit of the substantive law provisions of the Quran³⁰ leaves many pertinent questions unanswered. As a result, the issue on the retraction of the consent remains open. Meanwhile, under Faraid, God-fearing Muslims will continue to be guided by their religious conscience and sense of social justice.

Hairani Saban Hardjoe
Chung Tan & Partners
E-mail: hsh17@singnet.com.sg

Notes

1 Muslim law of inheritance. See Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura ,Friday Sermon, 6 July 2001 M / 14 Rabiul         Akhir 1422 H, Faraid : A Command from Allah.
2 See Asaf AA Fayzee, Outlines of Muhammadan Law Fourth Edition at p 248.
3 http://app.Faraid.gov.sg/syariah/fag-e.asp. Refer also to Dr. Abid Hussain’s article – The Islamic Law on Inheritance, where he quotes: ’Allah commands you regarding your children. For the male, a share equivalent to that of two females. ‘[Quran 4:11] This first principle which the Quran lays down refers to males and females of equal degree and class. This means that a son inherits a share equivalent to that of two daughters, a full (germane) brother inherits twice as much as a full sister, a son’s son inherits twice as much as a son’s daughter and so on.’
4 See AA Fyzee at p 366.
5 Counsel for the defendant, also counsel advising the grandchildren under the Will had reverted to the use of the Deeds of Acceptance in his proposal to settle the estate among the beneficiaries – outside the direction given under the Will. See Shiraz Abidally Husain and Another v Husain Safdar Abidally [2007] SGCA at 16para_A1.
6 Husain Safdar Abidally v Shiraz Safdar Abidally& Another [2006]4 SLR 800.
7 [1985] 1 MLJ 24. Suit Number: OS 237/1984. Decision Date:    17 Oct 1984.
8    Supra.
9    Ibid at para 9.
10 Ibid at para 8.
11 Ibid at para 21.
12 Ibid at para 23.
13 [2007]SGCA 16.
14 Ibid. at para 22.
15 Ibid at para 20 CA.
16 Surah 2.180 – 182 of the Koran.
17 See the article ‘Faraid: The Forgotten Wisdom ‘ by Abdul Asis Hassan,       - The 4E Journal ,October 2005.
18 Majlis Ugama Islam of Singapore.
19 Supra.
20 Administration of Muslim Law Act.
21 Refer to the Gudang Kuning Website.
22 MUIS have consistently held the position that there is no right of survivorship in claims involving Muslim estate. MUIS has in effect treated the survivor of such interest as a trustee to whom the registration regime, namely the Singapore Land Authority, has given recognition as the sole registered proprietor by right of    survivorship under local land law.
23 Asaf AA Fyzee Outlines of Muhammadan Law , Fourth Edition at p 228. The case referred to is : Mahomed Jusub v Fatmahbai Jusub (1946) 49 Bombay LR 505.Refer further to the writer’s article on ‘Hukum faraid and AMLA As An Adjunct of Muslim Law In Singapore’, October 2006 Issue of the Singapore Law Gazette at p 25.
24 Supra.
25 Asaf AA Fyzee Outlines of Muhamaddan Law , Fourth Edition at p 366.
26 The declaration.
27 The Islamic Wills http://www.islam101.com/sociology/wills.htm
28 AMLA section 114.
29 See the case of Abdul Yusof (on the  Gudang Kuning website) where a trust created under a Will of the testator made in the 1950s was interpreted to be valid dispite the beneficiaries’ plea that the resultant postponement of distribution as directed under the Will was causing hardship and social injustice to them. The beneficiaries contend that Faraid requires the assets to be distributed expeditiously and that the postponement as directed under Will was therefore contrary to Faraid. The technical approach to the interpretation of applicable statute laws may require a review.
30 Supra Surah 2.180-182 of the Quran.